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DID THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE WORK?
Simon M. Meisenberg*
In his 2007 Alec Roche Annual Lecture in Public International Law at
the University of Oxford, former President of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Judge Theodor Meron, asked:
“Does international criminal justice work?” For such an assessment, Judge
Meron suggested four criteria: i) finding and trying alleged perpetrators; ii)
providing a fair trial; iii) deterring international crimes; and iv) promoting
peace and healing.1
How would such an assessment for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) look like? Did the Special Court for Sierra Leone work? Moreover,
does Professor Jalloh’s comprehensive assessment in his book The Legal
Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provide an honest and
straightforward answer to this question? Obviously, Professor Jalloh worked
in the trenches of the SCSL in Freetown and The Hague. Therefore, and as
equally noted by Judge Meron at the outset of his assessment of the ad hoc
tribunals, Professor Jalloh’s assessment may naturally tend to answer the
question with a resounding “Yes” or “Yes, but . . . ,” as any negative response
would inevitably tarnish his own professional heritage. The detail and rigor
of Professor Jalloh’s assessment, his critical but polite and witty observations
prove that his appraisal is genuine and made in the best academic fashion. He
puts the finger on the sore spots of the jurisprudential legacy of the SCSL, in
particular where the reasoning of the decisions and judgments are weak or at
times questionable. The book is without any doubt an objective and critical
assessment of the Court’s work.
Having said this, how did the SCSL perform according to Judge
Meron’s four-pronged criteria and to the assessment of Professor Jalloh? It is
of note that Professor Jalloh’s study of the SCSL focuses on the
jurisprudential legacy, but it nevertheless provides sufficient detail to assess
the Court’s work according to Judge Meron’s test.

*
Simon M. Meisenberg (LLM) is Chef de Cabinet/Senior Legal Officer at the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers (The Hague). He has been working as Senior Legal Officer at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
in Freetown and The Hague.
1 THEODOR MERON, Does International Criminal Justice Work?, in THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: SELECTED SPEECHES 139 (2011).
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Finding and trying alleged perpetrators and providing fair trials: Only
six months after the conclusion of the agreement between the UN and the
Government of Sierra Leone on January 16, 2002, the Court began
establishing its offices and operating with an advance team by July 2002.
Judges were sworn in on July 25, 2002, and a first Plenary was held in early
March 2003. Thereafter, the Prosecutor quickly filed charges against thirteen
individuals whom it believed to bear the greatest responsibility for the
atrocities committed during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone between 1996
and 2001. Almost all individuals were arrested within months. The arrest and
trial of Taylor, the only non-Sierra Leone national who had to be arrested
outside Sierra Leonean territory, was a more complex affair and stalled the
overall impressive record of apprehending the perpetrators. Three joined
trials were conducted within an average of three years, and the individual trial
of Taylor took four years. All accused were guaranteed the minimum fair trial
rights in accordance with international human rights law and made use of
their right to challenge questions of fact and law before an appeals bench.
The appeals process on average took about seven months for the AFRC, RUF
and CDF Trials.2 The Taylor appeal took considerably longer. Overall, nine
persons were convicted and sentenced, one person died during trial, one died
shortly after his arrest, and one before his arrest. Only one person is formally
still at large but believed to be deceased. Approximately a decade after its
establishment, the SCSL concluded its mandate in 2013.
This is undeniably an impressive record, despite the constant criticism
at the time about the languor of the trials.3 The critical question under Judge
Meron’s first two criteria is, however, whether all perpetrators were found
and tried fairly. The SCSL mandate focused on those “who bear the greatest
responsibility . . . including those leaders who, in committing such crimes,
have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process
in Sierra Leone.”4 Professor Jalloh concludes that this formulation was
chosen to limit the jurisdiction of the Court and to ensure an efficient and

2 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment (March 2, 2009); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment (May 28, 2008).
3 See ANTONIO CASSESE, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 1 ¶ 3 (Dec. 12,
2006), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Cassese%20Report.pdf (“This institutional experiment was
indisputably innovative and broke new ground in international criminal justice. However, although
meritorious in many respects, the new judicial body has not fully lived up to its initial expectations from
the viewpoint of expeditiousness.”).
4 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145.
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cost-effective tribunal that would only prosecute a handful of perpetrators.5
Despite the legal challenges identified by Professor Jalloh with the concept
of only prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility, it has to be
stated that this model of narrowing the mandate of an international court
ensures that international criminal justice works in an effective manner.
International criminal justice can never entirely substitute a domestic judicial
system and prosecute all perpetrators of atrocity crimes. It can only
complement domestic prosecutions and other transitional justice
mechanisms, such as a truth and reconciliation commission. In addition,
focusing on the leading warmongers effectively and eventually silences their
willing executioners. Uprooting and prosecuting all the leaders of the warring
factions of the Sierra Leone conflict was undoubtedly one of the key elements
that ensured a successful peace process in the war-torn country. All previous
attempts and measures, for example providing blanket amnesties to
perpetrators, were in vain and not successful. To be sure, this is not to say
that the SCSL is alone responsible for ensuring a successful transition to
peace, but it was an effective ingredient. The unease identified by Professor
Jalloh with respect to the concept of “those who bear the greatest
responsibility,” as it lacks legal specificity, should therefore not overshadow
a key tool that increases the potential of international criminal tribunals and
which keeps the expectations towards such courts within realistic boundaries.
Deterring international crimes and promoting peace and healing: The
consequence of limiting the prosecution of individuals before an international
criminal tribunal brings us to the third and fourth criteria. The gap created by
the absence of any credible domestic prosecution may alter a deterrent effect
created by international tribunals and may hinder peace and reconciliation.
The unfortunate absence of domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone is the
consequence of the Lomé amnesty agreement. The SCSL Appeals Chamber
held that such a blanket amnesty did not shield the prosecution from
international crimes, which may be prosecuted in accordance with the
principle of universality before an international tribunal. It did not pronounce
the effect of the amnesty for domestic crimes and prosecutions. In the specific
circumstances of Sierra Leone, and, given the violation of the amnesty deal
by the rebel factions, there are strong arguments to simply declare such a
Faustian bargain null and void, thereby providing domestic prosecutors with
a door opener to prosecute mid-level and low-level perpetrators.6 The SCSL

5

CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 146

(2020).
6 See Antonio Cassese, The Special Court and International Law: The Decision Concerning the
Lomé Agreement Amnesty, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1130–40 (2004).
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Appeals Chamber did not choose this path. This was an unusual restrictive
decision for an Appeals Chamber that otherwise did not shy away from
judicial ingenuity.7 On the other hand, this provided the TRC with the
necessary room to promote reconciliation within the war-torn Sierra Leonean
society. The fact that the Prosecutor even-handedly charged individuals of all
the warring factions equally contributed to the peace process and the healing
of the society. The SCSL was not established during an armed conflict but
only when it had ended. It was, therefore, not able to deter any crimes in that
specific context. But as Professor Jalloh points out in his discussion on the
relationship between the TRC and the SCSL, the creation of the Court was a
repudiation of the Lomé amnesty and a shift from the emphasis of
reconciliation towards punishment and deterrence.8 Too long was there the
belief among the rebel leadership of getting away with impunity despite the
commission of the most heinous crimes. Moreover, through the
establishment and the ground-breaking jurisprudence on the nonapplicability of amnesties and immunities of Head of States for international
crimes before international criminal tribunals, a clear deterrent message has
been sent that such heinous crimes will not go unpunished and that the rule
of law prevails over the rule of force. This general observation was also
shared by the Head of the Sierra Leonean delegation at the Kampala Review
Conference to the Rome Statute stating:
[I]n Sierra Leone, the Special Court has not only made
tremendous contributions to accountability through its legal
and judicial achievements; it has also developed our national
capacity, particularly for our law enforcement and legal
professionals, to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
those alleged to have committed crimes under international
law; and it has contributed to restoring confidence in the
institutions of State and the rule of law. Capacity building is of
critical importance for the principle of complementarity: at the
time the Special Court was established, Sierra Leone was
willing but unable to address those crimes. We were fortunate
to have the support of the international community in
establishing the Court to assist us to ensure that impunity
would not stand.9

7

See JALLOH, supra note 5, at 150–276.
Id. at 311.
9 Vandi Chidi Minah, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the
Republic of Sierra Leone, Statement by the Head of Delegation, to the Review Conference of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (June 2010).
8
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Professor Jalloh points to critical aspects of the SCSL jurisprudence.
Indeed, not everything was faultless, and his detailed assessment provides
proof of some unpersuasive aspects of some of the decisions. Such critical
analysis is important in the discussion of the jurisprudential legacy of the
SCSL. Nevertheless, from a holistic point of view and with some of the
weaknesses identified by Professor Jalloh, an overall assessment of Judge
Meron’s criteria would result in an overall positive reflection of the SCSL
legacy and that this model of international criminal justice did indeed work.

